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The Director of Central Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Walter L. Barrows  
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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1. Intelligence Community representatives at the monthly warning meeting on 17 May discussed Libyan activity in Benin, Soviet influence in Cape Verde, political instability in Senegal and Nigeria, prospects for new fighting in Chad, and next week's OAU summit meeting. There was consensus on the following warning notes

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2. Warning Notes:

- Libyan activity in Benin has increased again. Qadhafi's operatives probably will resume using Benin to carry out subversive and terrorist operations in Africa. (See paragraph 4.)
- Soviet activity is on the rise in Cape Verde, where Moscow probably seeks a new fishing agreement. If the Soviets also renew pressure for military access, the Praia government may eventually give in. (Paragraph 5.)
- Urban unrest in Senegal appears to have peaked for now, but student demonstrations and public protests over economic grievances probably will continue. (Paragraph 6.)

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4. Benin/Libya. State/INR began the discussion of Benin's relaxation of restrictions on Libyan activity.

- President Kerekou has backed down on restricting the Libyans in Benin, restrictions that he implemented after two Libyan terrorists were arrested in Senegal after transiting Cotonou in early March. The head of the Libyan Peoples Bureau has returned to Cotonou, the Sarra company used by Qadhafi's operatives as a front for terrorist operations has reopened, and Libyan Airways is commencing weekly service to Benin. Chadian rebels are again transiting Benin for military training in Libya.
- Analysts conclude that Tripoli virtually "owns" anyone of importance in the Benin government. Libya probably arranged for the arrest of the pro-Western head of the public security forces, who stands accused of coup-plotting. Although the coup plot probably stemmed from military discontent and economic grievances, Benin's security forces now blame the US.

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5. Cape Verde/USSR. DIA led the discussion of increasing Soviet activity in Cape Verde.

- Signs of greater Soviet presence in Praia are everywhere. The Soviets' new embassy there appears to be Moscow's largest in Africa. Soviets are heavily involved in construction and rehabilitation of the port, and they use the Praia airport to rotate crews for their fishing fleet. Moscow also is strengthening its party-to-party ties with the Cape Verdeans.
- State/INR concluded that Cape Verde really is up for grabs; it will deal with the Soviets, the South Africans, or whomever will provide assistance. Soviet military assistance probably holds little attraction for Cape Verde, however, because it is reducing the size of its armed forces and has little need for additional arms or equipment. For their part, the Soviets may have in mind using Cape Verde to support ocean-reconnaissance operations by their TU-95 aircraft.

6. Senegal. CIA/ALA introduced the topic of unrest in Senegal.

- Demonstrations provoked by the arrest of opposition leader Wade probably have run their course now that Wade is out of jail on a suspended sentence. Because Wade needs an official amnesty if he hopes to hold public office, he seems conciliatory and unlikely to stimulate more protests for now.
- President Diouf also has placated city dwellers upset over economic conditions by reducing the prices of selected staple goods. But reduced export prices for peanuts may anger some producers.
- Diouf is again pressing to create a Prime Ministry to relieve him of responsibility for day-to-day management of the government, and to release his hard-working but unpopular adviser Jean Collin. Nonetheless, Collin probably will not depart, and Diouf is likely to continue equivocating on other issues.

7. Chad/Libya. DIA led the discussion of prospects for renewed fighting or a negotiated conclusion to the Chadian war.

- There has been little military activity recently, and nothing significant is likely before the OAU ad hoc committee meets on the Aozou Strip territorial question next week. After that, the Chadians may stage a raid--probably to attack the Matan as Sarra airbase in southern Libya--but not a major offensive. In general, Habre's forces in northern Chad are receiving enough supplies to sustain themselves in a defensive posture, but not to go on the offensive. Moreover, Habre still lacks airworthy C-130 transport aircraft, and imminent seasonal rains will further hinder logistic operations on the ground.

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- The Libyans also are unlikely to launch a major attack without first conducting large-scale logistic and training activity that we would detect. For now, the Libyans seem to be concentrating on rebuilding Goukouni's Chadian dissident group, the GUNT. Because Qadhafi's troops presently occupy the Aozou Strip, analysts see little to be gained by mounting another offensive.
- There is, of course, some potential for an unintended eruption of fighting. A GUNT raid, for example, could provoke a strong Chadian reaction that might lock both sides into an escalatory spiral. However, analysts believe that Habre's forces could cope with any Libyan or GUNT thrust, either across the Libyan-Chad border or through western Sudan.
- The OAU committee probably will make an inconclusive announcement. Most likely, it will defer a ruling on the ownership of the Aozou Strip, call for continuing the ceasefire until the issue is resolved, and possibly refer the territorial question to the International Court of Justice.

8. The Organization of African Unity Summit Meeting. State/INR summarized prospects for next week's OAU anniversary meeting.

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- We anticipate nothing to come out of the meeting, however, that would have substantial impact upon US interests in Africa. The ministerial meeting from 19 through 24 May will discuss African candidates for leadership positions in various international organizations, where Africa is very underrepresented. The OAU Secretary General will report on the Middle East and Palestine, despite expected irritation by some participants who believe that the OAU spends too much time on non-African issues. The presidential summit that will follow from 26 through 28 May will include discussion of some key African issues, however. The agenda will include southern Africa, African external debt, nominations to succeed Kenneth Kaunda as OAU Secretary General, and selection of a site for next year's OAU summit meeting. Of greatest interest to the West will be the African strategy for debt negotiations; Western creditors want to continue the individual country-by-country talks, while many Africans support a large conference that would enable African debtors to adopt a unified position.
- If Ethiopian rebels in Eritrea or Tigray stage a spectacular attack to gain publicity during the OAU conference in Addis Ababa, it would probably not have significant impact on military prospects in the insurgencies.

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9. Nigeria. CIA/ALA led the discussion of instability in Nigeria and Lagos's pressure on nearby Equatorial Guinea.

- Likely continued economic discontent will not threaten the Babangida regime. We expect some consumer prices to be reduced, but the high cost of living will continue to stimulate popular dissatisfaction. Lagos plans a slightly stimulative budget this year, which will displease Nigeria's foreign creditors, so the country's financial situation will remain troubled. Analysts generally expect continued slow forward movement on Nigeria's ambitious structural adjustment program.
- There is no viable alternative to the current regime, and President Babangida is sufficiently experienced at coup plotting to keep control of the situation. Available intelligence reports indicate that senior military officers continue to support Babangida, but analysts remain uneasy that we may be missing something. Moreover, we know little about the attitudes of junior officers. The approaching transition to civilian rule could spark coup plotting in the military, although it also serves as a safety valve on political discontent by enabling those who are dissatisfied with official corruption and military rule to foresee an end to the current regime.
- The consensus was that Nigeria's threats to Equatorial Guinea to expel several South African managers of a farming project will not lead to military action. Nigeria's paranoia about South Africans near its border notwithstanding, this tempest in a teapot will pass.



Walter L. Barrows

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